

**PROVA DE PROFICIÊNCIA EM LÍNGUA INGLESA PARA ALUNOS DE RELAÇÕES
INTERNACIOS – 2023/2**

Nome: _____

Curso: _____

Instruções Gerais:

1. Apresentar documento de identidade com foto.
2. Responder às questões em língua portuguesa, com caneta azul ou preta na folha abaixo. O rascunho não será corrigido. E respostas à lápis não serão aceitas.
3. É permitido consultar dicionários e gramáticas em papel, individualmente.
4. Não é permitido utilizar celulares, laptops, notebooks, tablets e canetas tradutoras.
5. Entregar a prova no prazo máximo de duas (2) horas.
6. Serão considerados aprovados os candidatos que demonstrarem proficiência, com aproveitamento igual ou superior a 50% de acertos.

<https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/99/4/1755/7167127?searchresult=1>

Muyang Chen, China's rise and the reshaping of sovereign debt relief, *International Affairs*, Volume 99, Issue 4, July 2023, Pages 1755–1775, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad108>

Abstract

China has become the world's largest bilateral creditor to low- and middle-income countries, and yet its participation in collective debt-relief frameworks led by western multilateral institutions—the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Paris Club—has not met those institutions' expectations. Prevailing discussion perceives China's 'reserved' participation as free-riding on or contesting the international sovereign debt regime. This article advances ongoing discussion by drawing a historical parallel between China's current debt-relief approach and that of the United States and the multilateral institutions during and after the debt crisis of the 1980s. The article finds that towards the end of the 1980s, the US transitioned from practicing a new money approach—continued financing for existing projects—to a haircut approach—increasingly writing off debts. Around the same time, multilateral institutions started to become more acceptive of debt forgiveness. Yet China's policy banks, the main financiers of its overseas projects, have been primarily practising a commercially oriented, new money approach. China's rise has therefore revitalized an approach that western private banks once commonly practised and weakened the current international sovereign debt regime that took shape in the post-1980s decades.

1. Qual é o paralelo histórico proposto pelo resumo? (1 ponto)

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2. Segundo o resumo, como os Estados Unidos mudaram a sua abordagem de financiamento no final da década de 1980? (1 ponto)

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3. Qual é a abordagem de financiamento praticada pela China e qual a sua consequência? (2 pontos)

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<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/belt-road-initiative-xi-imf>

01. China’s Road to Ruin

02. The Real Toll of Beijing’s Belt and Road

By Michael Bennon and Francis Fukuyama

Published on August 22, 2023

03. This year marks the tenth anniversary of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road
04. Initiative, the largest and most ambitious infrastructure development project in human
05. history. China has lent more than \$1 trillion to more than 100 countries through the scheme,
06. dwarfing Western spending in the developing world and stoking anxieties about the spread
07. of Beijing’s power and influence. Many analysts have characterized Chinese lending through
08. the BRI as “debt trap diplomacy” designed to give China leverage over other countries and
09. even seize their infrastructure and resources. After Sri Lanka fell behind on payments for its
10. troubled Hambantota port project in 2017, China obtained a 99-year lease on the property
11. as part of a deal to renegotiate the debt. The agreement sparked concerns in Washington
12. and other Western capitals that Beijing’s real aim was to acquire access to strategic facilities
13. throughout the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Americas.

14. But over the last few years, a different picture of the BRI has emerged. Many Chinese-
15. financed infrastructure projects have failed to earn the returns that analysts expected. And
16. because the governments that negotiated these projects often agreed to backstop the loans,
17. they have found themselves burdened with huge debt overhangs—unable to secure
18. financing for future projects or even to service the debt **they** have already accrued. This is
19. true not just of Sri Lanka but also of Argentina, Kenya, Malaysia, Montenegro, Pakistan,
20. Tanzania, and many others. The problem for the West was less that China would acquire
21. ports and other strategic properties in developing countries and more that these countries
22. would become dangerously indebted—forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund
23. (IMF) and other Western-backed international financial institutions for help repaying their
24. Chinese loans.

25. In many parts of the developing world, China has come to be seen as a rapacious and
26. unbending creditor, not so different from the Western multinational corporations and
27. lenders that sought to collect on bad debts in decades past. Far from breaking new ground
28. as a predatory lender, in other words, China seems to be following a path well worn by
29. Western investors. In so doing, however, Beijing risks alienating the very countries it set out
30. to woo with the BRI and squandering its economic influence in the developing world. It also
31. risks exacerbating an already painful debt crisis in emerging markets that could lead to a “lost
32. decade” of the kind many Latin American countries experienced in the 1980s.

33. To avoid that dire outcome—and to avoid spending Western taxpayer dollars to service bad
34. Chinese debts—the United States and other countries should push for broad-based reforms
35. that would make it more difficult to take advantage of the IMF and other international
36. financial institutions, imposing tougher criteria on countries seeking bailouts and demanding
37. more transparency in lending from all their members, including China.

4. Segundo o autor, muitos analistas classificam os empréstimos decorrentes da Iniciativa do Cinturão e Rota, projeto de desenvolvimento do governo chinês, como diplomacia da armadilha da dívida. Qual seria o verdadeiro objetivo da China segundo esses analistas?

(2 pontos)

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5. A que se refere o pronome “they” na linha de número 16?

(1 ponto)

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6. Qual é a proposta do autor para evitar uma “década perdida”, como a que muitos países latino-americanos vivenciaram nos anos 1980? (1 ponto)

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7. Traduza o segmento extraído do texto para o português. (2 pontos)

“The problem for the West was less that China would acquire ports and other strategic properties in developing countries and more that these countries would become dangerously indebted—forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other Western-backed international financial institutions for help repaying their Chinese loans.”

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